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Objectives: The present study examined the preliminary efficacy of an ultra-brief cognitive 
defusion intervention, compared to a positive self-affirmation intervention, on moderate 
subclinical Public Speaking Anxiety (PSA). Method: Sixty-three participants (M=25.70 yrs, 
SD=9.48) first completed a questionnaire assessing PSA symptomology and were then 
randomly assigned to receive one of two interventions (cognitive defusion, positive self-
affirmation) or nothing at all (no-treatment control). All participants then performed an 
impromptu speech task before recompleting the questionnaire. Results: A significant 
decrease in PSA was reported within the cognitive defusion condition, relative to the positive 
self-affirmation and no-treatment control conditions. Conclusions: An ultra-brief cognitive 
defusion intervention has the potential to reduce short-term anxiety among those with 
moderate PSA. 
 
















The fear of public speaking, or public speaking anxiety (PSA), is a context-dependent 
social anxiety occurring during real or imagined enactment of oral speeches, such as 
presentations and interviews (Bodie, 2010; Niles & Craske, 2019). PSA usually results in 
maladaptive behaviors such as a quivering voice, shaking knees, being at a loss for words and 
overestimating the extent to which one is negatively evaluated by an audience (Beatty, 1988; 
Savitsky & Gilovich, 2003; Shi, Brinthaup, & McCree, 2015). Accordingly, PSA tends to 
hinder the ability to focus, to think clearly, to form sentences and to utter speech with 
adequate volume and direction (Voncken & Bögels, 2008). As such, it is unsurprising that the 
speech performance of individuals with PSA is classed as being significantly poorer than 
those without it (Hofmann, Gerlach, Wender, & Roth, 1997).  
Although PSA is diverse in its manifestations, it has been reported that it is the most 
widespread social anxiety (Furmark, Tilfors, Stattin, Ekselius, & Frederickson, 2000; Stein, 
Walker, & Forde, 1996; Tilfors & Furmark, 2007) and is believed to affect 33% of the US 
population at a clinical level (Ruscio, Brown, Sareen, Stein, & Kessler, 2008). However, 
given that the distress associated with PSA lies on a continuum ranging from mild to severely 
debilitating (Bögels et al., 2010), it has been estimated that 63% of the general population 
also report the fear (Marinho, de Mederios, Gama, & Teixeira, 2017). Considering that 
numerous organizations and educational establishments require engagement in public 
speaking tasks, empirically validated intervention techniques are needed to reach those with 
moderate or subclinical levels of PSA (Jackson, Compton, Thornton, & Dimmock, 2017). 
Some attempts have been made in this regard, with approaches that employ 
habituation methods in combination with direct modification of irrational cognitions found to 
be useful (Amir, Weber, Beard, Bomyea, & Taylor, 2008; Allen, Hunter & Donohue, 1989; 
Anderson, Zimmand, Hodges, & Rothbaum, 2005). In recent years, growing attention has 
also been paid in the clinical literature to Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; 
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Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999), which may be particularly helpful in the domain of PSA 
given its emphasis on psychological acceptance (England et al., 2012; see also Gallego, 
McHugh, Villatte, & Lappalainen, 2020). Empirical studies have supported the use of ACT in 
this context. For example, both Block and Wulfert (2000) and England et al. (2012) found 
that ACT-based interventions positively impacted sub-clinical PSA.  
However, while the potential benefits of a broad ranging ACT intervention merit 
further investigation (see Craske et al., 2014, for a discussion on social phobia more 
generally), ultra-brief (i.e., extremely short) interventions that can be widely distributed, 
readily self-applied outside of clinical contexts and that do not require the need for clinical 
supervision may better suit the needs of those with subclinical PSA. ACT seems perfectly 
placed to help in the creation of such interventions because each of ACT’s six core processes 
can be harnessed and delivered as stand-alone interventions. Indeed, the core process of 
cognitive defusion (or just defusion) has shown much empirical success when delivered as a 
brief intervention (Larsson, Hooper, Osborne, Bennett, & McHugh, 2016; Masuda, Hayes, 
Sackett, & Twohig, 2004; Masuda et al., 2010; Tyndall, Papworth, Roche, & Bennett, 2017)1.  
 Cognitive fusion, the antithesis of defusion, refers to a contextually controlled 
behavior-behavior relation in which thoughts and feelings are responded to as if they are 
actually ‘true’ (i.e., the literal content of such thoughts must be abided by; see Hayes et al., 
2006; Hooper & McHugh, 2013). This rigid alignment of covert thoughts and feelings with 
overt actions characterises cognitive fusion, which is, in effect, a process-level description of 
rigid and maladaptive patterns of behavior (Assaz, et al., 2018). For example, in the case of 
                                                                
1 Cognitive defusion is often discussed using mid-level terms and is not easily reducible to 
basic behavioral processes. This potential problem has been much commented upon (see 
Assaz, Roche, Kanter, & Oshiro, 2018). While we will discuss this here in somewhat 
process-based terminology, we will also use the mid-level terms employed by ACT 
researchers, for the purposes of convenience, and also because the current study is not a 
study on ACT core processes per se. 
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PSA, a person’s overt response may become ‘fused’ with a thought such as, ‘I will embarrass 
myself if I give a talk in front of my work colleagues, so I must avoid having to give it at all 
costs’. Such avoidance behavior is negatively reinforced, in that avoiding giving the public 
presentation reduces the risk of experiencing the potentially punishing effects of feelings of 
embarrassment in front of peers. From a behavior-analytic perspective, rather than invoking 
embarrassment as a putative cause of avoidance, avoiding giving a public presentation 
reduces the risk of obtaining a negative audience response to one's public speaking. That 
audience could be others, ourselves or both, and the experience of embarrassment would 
secondary to that negative response. However, if cognitively fused thoughts such as these 
lead to repetitive avoidance behavior in such contexts, it may detrimentally influence a 
worker’s periodical performance review or chances of promotion within their organization.  
Defusion aims to counteract this process by teaching individuals to observe thoughts 
for what they are (verbal stimuli that come and go), rather than as what the mind suggests 
them to be (verbal rules and truths that must be adhered to). Bringing the client’s attention to 
the experience of variations in the response functions of stimuli, rather than to the functions 
themselves, enables private verbal relations between thoughts, feelings and actions, to be 
weakened. Thus, formerly problematic stimuli can be approached more openly and 
experienced as less threatening (Pilecki & McKay, 2012). Hence, defusion techniques aim to 
loosen, or defuse, the relationship between thoughts and action. In other words, a person who 
improves their levels of defusion will be able to observe their thoughts without them 
impacting overt behavior.  
One study employed a brief defusion intervention in the context of public speaking 
with participants suffering with clinical levels of general social anxiety (Barrera, Szafranski, 
Rantcliff, Garnaat, & Norton, 2016). Barrera et al. compared a defusion technique (word-
repetition exercise) to a cognitive restructuring technique and control condition in reducing 
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general social anxiety and impact of self-relevant negative thoughts, using a public speaking 
task as in-vivo exposure to induce social anxiety. No significant improvement in social 
anxiety symptoms during the public speech task were found using either active intervention. 
No study, however, has attempted to investigate an ultra-brief defusion intervention for those 
with subclinical PSA. The present study aims to fill this gap by investigating the 
effectiveness of an ultra-brief defusion intervention on PSA symptoms among a sample of 
those with moderate PSA. Defusion will be compared to a positive self-affirmation 
intervention (Sherman, 2013; Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988), which involves the 
individual in question repeating positive statements about oneself in the hope that it disrupts 
negative thought processes. Positive self-affirmation was chosen as the active comparison 
intervention. There is some support for the idea that positive self-affirmation may help 
counteract the negative impact of rumination around perceived threatening situations (e.g., 
Koole, Smeets, van Kinippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999; Sherman, 2013; Sherman, Nelson, 
& Steele, 2000). Moreover, positive self-affirmation closely aligns to strategies that people 
tend to intuitively draw upon prior to giving a public speech performance (Jackson et al., 
2017 for a discussion of inoculation interventions prior to public speech; see also Brooks, 
2014 for a discussion of strategies to cope with pre-performance anxiety).  
A positive affirmation intervention is of particular interest because it represents an 
ideal contrast to a common defusion exercise (the word-repetition technique) at a process 
level. Specifically, while positive affirmations involve evoking the reinforcing and appetitive 
response functions of words (e.g., “I am wonderful”), the word repetition method involves 
exposure to both the appetitive and aversive response functions of words. This defusion 
exercise is thought to work precisely by broadening the range of possible responses an 
individual makes to a stimulus that formerly had only a limited range of response functions 
(Masuda et al., 2004). For example, repeating the word “Spider” for a spider phobic does not 
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directly target the aversive functions of the word but does expose the client to auditory 
response functions, tactile response functions within the vocal musculature, and perhaps other 
covert response functions involving other more distantly related words and covert imagery. 
This, in effect, represents a broadening of the response functions of the problematic stimulus, 
rather than an effort to narrow the response functions to appetitive responses only (e.g., 
“Spiders are wonderful”). This difference in approach may seem small but it is important 
from an ACT perspective. 
Given that anxiety and distress are often observed simultaneously (Hackmann, Clark, 
& McManus, 2000; McNeil, Ries, & Turk, 1995), it is prudent to also examine distress in this 
public speaking context (see Barrera et al., 2016; Price & Anderson, 2011). Given that 
cognitive defusion aims to alter the context the context in which negative private events are 
experienced, it may be the case that levels of self-reported distress might decrease following 
a function-altering intervention. Based on previous findings that defusion is efficacious in 
reducing the impact of negative thoughts, it is expected that those receiving the defusion 
intervention will experience greater reductions in self-reported levels of PSA compared to 
those receiving the positive self-affirmation intervention. Furthermore, it is predicted that 
those in both the defusion and positive self-affirmation conditions will report significantly 
greater reductions in PSA than those in a no-treatment control condition. Finally, the relative 
impact of very brief defusion and positive self-affirmation interventions on subjective reports 
of distress will be examined. 
Method 
Participants  
Seventy-one participants were recruited through opportunity sampling of individuals 
at the University of X, using a Psychology Research Participation Scheme, university 
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emailing system, and social media forums. Participants possessing significantly high or low 
levels of PSA at baseline were excluded prior to the start of the study (see procedure section), 
leaving a final sample of n= 63 (46 females and 17 males), with ages ranging from 19 to 56 
yrs (M=25.70, SD=9.48). Undergraduate students (n=51) accounted for 81% of participants, 
with the remaining 19% (n=12) in full or part-time employment.  
Materials  
Personal Report of Public Speaking Anxiety (PRPSA; McCroskey, 1970). The 
PRPSA is a 34-item self-report instrument which assesses the level of anxiety one 
experiences while holding a public presentation, with items rated on a 5-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 5 (‘strongly agree’). The PRPSA is a 
unidimensional scale, which is one of few precisely measuring public speaking. McCroskey 
(1970) found a high level of internal consistency (Cronbachs’s α=.90), and well-established 
test-retest reliability (r=.84) for the PRPSA. For the purpose of the current study, 12 of the 
original 34 items (based on previous pilot work in our laboratory) were chosen due to their 
focus on public speaking as a class assignment and speech performance relative to anxiety. 
Thus, the items assessed severity of both cognitive symptoms (i.e., ‘I am in constant fear of 
forgetting what I prepared to say’) and physiological symptoms (i.e. ‘I perspire just before 
getting up to speak’) in relation to generalized PSA. Data from the 12-items supports the 
internal reliability previously found (α=.90). With a possible total range of 12-60, three 
classification categories were employed as follows: 12-20: Extremely low anxiety; 21-50: 
Moderate-High anxiety; 51-60: Extremely high anxiety. A test-retest correlation for the 12-
item PRSPA for the Control Condition of 0.86 provides support for the 12-item PRSPA for 
reliably assessing change (Jacobson & Truax, 1991).  
Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1969). The SUDS is a one-item 
self-rated scale assessing subjective distress to specific stimuli. For the present study, the 
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scale was tailored to suit a public speaking scenario (i.e. ‘Please indicate the level of distress 
you experience when faced with a public speaking task’). Scores range from 0 (‘No distress; 
totally relaxed’) to 100 (‘Highest distress that you have ever felt’). The SUDS is designed to 
measure changes in anxiety/distress along the course of exposure-based therapies (Wolpe, 
1990).  
Procedure 
 Following the obtainment of ethical approval from the University of X Research 
Ethics Committee, participants completed the PRPSA questionnaire and one-item SUDS 
using Qualtrics online survey software (Qualtrics, Provo UT, 2016). Eligible participants 
(those who scored in the moderate-high category for PRPSA only) were subsequently 
contacted via email with a laboratory appointment time. There were seven days between pre-
screening and the intervention. Upon entering the laboratory, participants completed the 
PRPSA and SUDS online via Qualtrics on a Dell Inspiron laptop, as the pre-intervention 
baseline measures for anxiety and distress, respectively. Each participant was subsequently 
asked to generate and write down on paper a negative self-evaluative phrase that related to 
their personal experiences regarding public speaking (e.g., ‘I’ll make a mistake and look like 
an idiot’). Participants were then assigned to condition and began the intervention process. 
Participants in the defusion condition reduced their self-evaluative negative phrase 
into a single word (e.g., idiot) that best encompassed their overall worry/fear whilst partaking 
in public speech. Participants then executed a word repetition task using this word. First 
introduced by Titchener (1916), the task is based on the notion that excessive repetition of 
problematic words, such as ‘embarrassment’ can reduce their harmful impact as the semantic 
meaning of the word becomes weakened across repetitions. More specifically, across 
repeated exposures to the word, non-semantic features of the word stimulus, such as sound 
forms, word length, and other associative properties based on rhymes, approximate 
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homonyms or synonyms, become salient and compete with the formerly dominant 
conditioned aversive features. In this way, new responses to the stimulus are created (e.g., 
noticing that it has a funny sound, or is hard to pronounce), that dilute the probability of a 
single and well-rehearsed aversive reaction to it (see Blackledge, 2015 and Tyndall et al., 
2017 for discussions of the potential underlying behavioral processes). Participants were 
asked to repeat aloud their chosen negative self-referential word at their fastest speed for a 
period of 30 seconds, which is a duration recommended by previous literature (see Masuda et 
al., 2009). 
Participants in the positive self-affirmation condition were first taught to recognize 
their generated self-evaluative phrase as dysfunctional. They were subsequently asked to 
cognitively reframe their phrase, by thinking about its rationality and rewriting it to become a 
positive, rational thought (e.g. ‘I will probably do ok on this task’). Participants in the no-
treatment control condition were required to complete an irrelevant numerical task, which 
consisted of counting backwards from 100 as fast as they could. Each intervention took 
around 30 seconds to complete. 
After completing their interventions, all participants completed a Behavioral 
Assessment Test (BAT; Clark et al., 1997), which consisted of an impromptu speech in front 
of the researcher on a randomly selected topic; your dream job. The researcher maintained a 
neutral facial expression throughout. The impromptu speech task is designed to induce a 
realistic public speaking scenario, and is regarded as a reliable method for directly testing 
public speaking anxiety (e.g., Anderson & Price, 2011; McNeil, Ries, & Turk, 1995). 
Immediately after completion of the impromptu speech task, participants recompleted the 
PRPSA and SUDS, as the post-intervention measures. Finally, participants were given a 
debrief form explaining the purpose of the study and the condition in which they had just 




Data Analytic Strategy 
Overall scores from the dependent variable (PRPSA) were compared between the 
three treatment conditions (between-subjects) across two time-periods (within-subjects). 
Thus, a 3 (treatment group: defusion vs. positive self-affirmation vs. no-treatment control) x 2 
(time point: pre-treatment vs. post-treatment) mixed model design was employed, where 
treatment group and time point were the independent variables. A mixed design ANOVA was 
conducted in order to establish any interaction or main effects between the type of 
intervention technique, at both time periods.  
Analyses 
Preliminary analyses were executed to establish whether the assumptions of a mixed 
ANOVA were satisfied. The assumption of homogeneity was met (p >.05), as well as Box’s 
test of equality of covariance matrices (p >.05). Normality was established for all variables, 
using Kolmogorov-Smirnov (p >.05). At both time 1 (pre-intervention) and time 2 (post-
intervention), each condition (defusion, positive self-affirmation, no-treatment control) 
comprised 21 participants. Prior to the statistical analysis of data, two one-way between-
subjects ANOVAs were conducted on the baseline PRPSA and SUDS scores. No statistically 
significant differences were found (PRPSA p = .584 and SUDS p= .304). Both pre-
intervention and post-intervention descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The 3 (defusion vs. positive self-affirmation vs. no-treatment control) × 2 (pre-
treatment vs. post-treatment) mixed design ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
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time, F(1,60)=4.005, MSE=17.486, p<.05,  ηp
2 = .077. More specifically, there was a 
significant decrease in PSA scores from pre-intervention (M= 38.61, SD= 8.89) to post-
intervention (M= 36.95, SD=10.33, 95% CI [.176 to 3.157], p <.05), when condition was not 
accounted for. However, there was no significant main effect of condition on PSA scores 
(F(2,60)=.013, MSE=171.84 , p=.987, ηp
2 <.001). A significant time x condition interaction 
emerged (F(2,60)= 4.342, MSE=17.486, p<.02, ηp
2= .126). Further investigation into this 
interaction, using simple main effect analyses, revealed there was a statistically significant 
effect of time on PSA levels within the defusion condition (F(1,20)=7.885, MSE= 30.195, p= 
.01, ηp
2 = .283), whereby PSA levels were significantly lower at post-intervention (M=35.48, 
SD=8.27) compared to pre-intervention (M=40.24, SD= 10.46, 95% CI [-8.299 to –1.225], 
p=.01). However, there were no significant decreases from pre-intervention to post-
intervention within the positive self-affirmation and no-treatment control conditions. More 
clearly put, the Cohen’s d within-subject effect size of pre-test to post-test change for the 
cognitive defusion condition showed a medium effect (.51). By contrast, Cohen’s d effect 
sizes for pre-test post-test change for the positive self-affirmation condition (.03) and control 
condition (.009) were minimal 
Distress levels (i.e., SUDS) were analysed with the same 3 x 2 mixed design 
ANOVA. Results yielded a significant main effect of Time on distress levels, F(1,60)=8.839, 
MSE=75.513, p<.01, ηp
2= .128. That is, distress levels decreased significantly from pre-
intervention (M=60.87, SD= 18.30) to post-intervention (M=56.27, SD= 19.09, 95% CI 
[1.506 to 7.700]) across conditions combined. However, there was no statistically significant 
difference in mean distress levels between conditions post-intervention (F(2,60)=.485, 
MSE=631.335, p=.971, ηp
2=0.16), and no significant Time x Condition interaction 
(F(2,60)=2.157, MSE=75.513, p=.125, ηp
2= .067. Cohen’s d pre-test post-test change score 
effect sizes revealed a medium effect size for the cognitive defusion condition (.47) and very 
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The current study aimed to compare the impact of an ultra-brief defusion intervention 
to a positive self-affirmation intervention among a sample of people with subclinical 
(moderate) PSA. The results demonstrated that the defusion intervention reduced anxiety 
following exposure to a public speaking task, compared to the positive self-affirmation 
intervention and a no-treatment control condition. This finding adds to a growing literature 
illustrating the positive impact of defusion, and in particular the positive impact of the word 
repetition exercise (Masuda et al., 2010; Tyndall et al., 2017).  
The present study marks an important contribution to the literature by showing that 
anxiety levels, in the case of persons who experience moderate levels of PSA, can be reduced 
with an extremely brief ACT-based intervention, even if reducing anxiety symptoms is not an 
overarching goal of defusion or of ACT more generally (Block & Wulfert, 2000). Although 
there were no significant PSA post-intervention score-only differences across the three 
conditions, only the defusion intervention demonstrated significant within-condition change, 
with a medium effect size. Nonetheless, the clinical significance of this finding is somewhat 
limited. However, given the very brief nature of the intervention, the timeframe involved, and 
the non-clinical sample employed, typical criteria for assessing the clinical significance of the 
intervention (e.g., Jacobsen & Truax, 1991) might not be appropriate.  
There were no differences in distress levels (i.e,, single-item SUDS) at post-
intervention in the cognitive defusion group relative to the positive self-affirmation group. 
There was no significant interaction between treatment type and time on distress scores 
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between cognitive defusion and positive affirmation conditions. However, there was a 
medium pre-test post-test change score effect size for the cognitive defusion condition, with 
very small effect sizes for both the positive self-affirmation and control conditions. As noted 
earlier, symptom reduction such as decrease in distress levels is not typically a target within 
ACT-based interventions but measures such as SUDS remain of interest to CBT practitioners 
(McNeil et al., 1995; Price & Anderson, 2011). It is not clear why the anxiety and distress 
measures might have differed in terms of effect sizes, and whether the distress effect size for 
the defusion condition was significant in this case, but it should be noted that the SUDS was a 
one-item measure of distress in this instance. Future researchers could look to examine the 
theoretical relation between anxiety and distress with respect to public speaking (Price & 
Anderson, 2011) in more depth, while utilizing a range of covert and overt measures of these 
constructs. 
The argument could be made that the results of the current study will not interest 
those who practice ACT, because of its focus on PSA symptomology. Specifically, ACT does 
not explicitly seek to reduce symptoms but instead aims to help people control their behavior 
in value-consistent ways. However, we argue that by reducing such anxiety, even 
temporarily, the opportunity for positive public speaking experiences is improved, as may be 
the assessments of one’s own competence at public speaking, and also one’s willingness to 
engage in future public speaking events. In this way, short-term reductions in anxiety could 
have a catalytic effect on a range of outcomes central to better overall psychological 
functioning or, at the very least, could help to prevent the converse occurring (i.e., whereby 
perceived failures in public speaking contexts leads to increased fear, enhanced negative self-
evaluations, more distress, and less willingness). 
There are several ways in which the current study could be improved. Although the 
reliability of an impromptu speech task is generally strong (Beidel, Turner, Jacob, & Cooley, 
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1989), it is possible that the task did not function as intended. That is, perhaps completing a 
public speaking task in front of one researcher did not have a sufficiently anxiety-inducing 
effect. Future studies may wish to increase anxiety by asking the participants to perform a 
public speaking task either to a group of people or to a video camera. Related to this issue, 
future studies may also wish to ensure that the interventions functioned as intended. 
Specifically, other defusion studies have measured believability as a way to ensure that 
participant cognitions, following a defusion intervention, are, in fact, more defused (Masuda 
et al., 2004; Masuda et al., 2009; Masuda et al., 2010; Tyndall et al., 2017). Moreover, future 
researchers may wish to administer either the Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ; 
Gillanders et al., 2014) or the more recently developed State Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire 
(SCFQ; Bolderston et al., 2019), to assess possible changes in cognitive fusion before and 
after such an intervention. 
Although the researcher maintained a neutral facial expression throughout the speech 
task, the design was limited by the fact that the researcher was not blind to condition 
assignment (it could be argued that the researcher might have inadvertently given more 
positive feedback to the participants in the defusion condition). This is something that could 
be easily ameliorated in future research. Measuring outcomes after both the interventions and 
the behavioral approach task (i.e., exposure) is another limitation, because it means that the 
results cannot be attributed to the word repetition intervention alone. Specifically, it could be 
the case that the word repetition task was responsible for the differential outcome, but it could 
also be the case that the repetition task interacted with the exposure task (Culver, Stoyanova, 
& Craske, 2012; Craske, Treanor, Conway, Zbozicke, & Vervliet, 2014). Future researchers 
could include a measure of expectancy violations to address this, as some theoretical models 
posit such expectancy violations are the core mechanism in exposure, and place less emphasis 
on the role of fear reduction (e.g., Craske et al., 2014).  
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The study can also be criticized for its over-reliance on self-report measures. Not only 
is it possible that such standardized questionnaires may not accurately capture all individuals’ 
personal public speaking experiences, but it is also possible that participants experienced 
demand characteristics in that they completed the same self-report measure on two occasions 
within close temporal proximity. Consequently, future research may wish to supplement 
these self-report measures with behavioral measures (Letamendi, Chavira, & Stein, 2009). 
That is, they should give participants a choice to engage or not engage with the public 
speaking task as a way to measure avoidance behavior, and they should ask independent 
observers to rate the performance, or even measure the amount of time that participants 
spoke, to better determine the behavioral impact of the intervention. Put more simply, future 
research could focus on whether such a brief intervention could enhance performance in a 
public speaking task. This would provide a more optimal behavioral measure of the utility or 
efficacy of the intervention and could be assessed using video recording and blind raters (e.g., 
Levin, Haeger, & Smith, 2017; Mesri et al., 2017). 
There are three final suggestions for future improvements. Firstly, future research 
may wish to improve statistical power. Although the current study had a considerably greater 
sample size than previous studies in this area (Block & Wulfert, 2000; England et al., 2012; 
Glassman et al., 2016), larger participant numbers would increase the reliability of the 
findings. Nevertheless, future research can use the data parameters reported here to generate 
sample sizes that are appropriate to analyse the low-level laboratory-controlled effects typical 
of this and other experimental psychopathology studies.  
Secondly, while the 34-item PRPSA (McCroskey, 1970) is a well-validated 
instrument, the current study is limited by the administration of a truncated 12-item version 
based on prior pilot work. To enhance validity and reliability, future researchers who do not 
wish to administer the full version might employ the 18-item PRPSA (see Montberg, 
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Jansson-Frojmark, Petterson, & Hennlid-Oredsson, 2018) or the Personal Report of 
Communication Apprehension, Public Speaking Subscale (PRSCA-PS; McCroskey, 1982; 
see also Gallego et al., 2020).  
Thirdly, given that positive self-affirmation interventions resemble thought stopping, 
thought distraction, or thought suppression techniques (e.g., Hooper, Davies, Davies, & 
McHugh, 2011; Hooper & McHugh, 2013; Hooper, Sandoz, Ashton, Clarke, & McHugh, 
2011; Masuda et al., 2010; Pilecki & McKay, 2012) which are somewhat limited in efficacy, 
future studies may wish to employ a more traditional cognitive restructuring procedure (e.g., 
Barrera et al., 2016; Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel, & Wolitzky-Taylor, 2011; Larrson et al., 2016), 
the process by which individuals learn to dispute maladaptive thoughts in order to alter their 
meaning (Heimberg & Becker, 2002; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). For example, rather than the 
current study’s focus on positive affirmation (e.g., “I will be confident when I speak”), which 
may be difficult for a person with moderate PSA to truly ‘accept’ or ‘believe’, a future study 
could focus on the likelihood of making a mistake with thought rationalisations such as “I am 
probably not going to make a major mistake” or cognitive restructuring of catastrophic 
thinking around mistakes (e.g., “Even if I make a mistake, I will eventually recover from it” 
or “I might make a mistake but few people would probably notice”). Such an approach would 
allow for a more direct comparison of the efficacy of an ACT-based technique (i.e., word-
repetition defusion intervention) versus a more traditional CBT-based technique (i.e., 
cognitive restructuring). 
Overall, the current results suggest that an ultra-brief cognitive defusion intervention 
significantly decreased the anxiety associated with a public speech task, compared to a 
positive self-affirmation exercise. While we acknowledge the limited clinical significance of 
this finding, the result of this preliminary study has potential applied implications. 
Specifically, the extremely brief nature of the defusion intervention may make it useful for 
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non-clinical samples dealing with the day-to-day anxieties of public presentations, which is 
particularly important considering the growing pressure placed upon individuals to perform 
competently and confidently in public speaking assignments in educational and work settings. 
The word-repetition exercise described herein provides individuals with an on-the-fly, cost-
effective and low time-consuming technique that can be applied in any context. 
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